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Mammalian and Avian Neuroanatomy and the Question of Consciousness in Birds

¹ The Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study and Department of Psychology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia
² Biophysics Group, Danish Technical University, DK-2800 Lyngby, Denmark

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed, at Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, MSN 2A1, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. E-mail: abbutler{at}gmu.edu

Some birds display behavior reminiscent of the sophisticated cognition and higher levels of consciousness usually associated with mammals, including the ability to fashion tools and to learn vocal sequences. It is thus important to ask what neuroanatomical attributes these taxonomic classes have in common and whether there are nevertheless significant differences. While the underlying brain structures of birds and mammals are remarkably similar in many respects, including high brain-body ratios and many aspects of brain circuitry, the architectural arrangements of neurons, particularly in the pallium, show marked dissimilarity. The neural substrate for complex cognitive functions that are associated with higher-level consciousness in mammals and birds alike may thus be based on patterns of circuitry rather than on local architectural constraints. In contrast, the corresponding circuits in reptiles are substantially less elaborated, with some components actually lacking, and in amphibian brains, the major thalamopallial circuits involving sensory relay nuclei are conspicuously absent. On the basis of these criteria, the potential for higher-level consciousness in these taxa appears to be lower than in birds and mammals.